



**MASENO UNIVERSITY**  
**UNIVERSITY EXAMINATIONS 2013/2014**

FIRST YEAR FIRST SEMESTER EXAMINATIONS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ECONOMICS  
(CITY CAMPUS - WEEKEND)

**AEC 801: ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS**

*Date: 24<sup>th</sup> November, 2013*

*Time: 2.00 - 5.00 p.m.*

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1. (a). Given Slutsky equation as  $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial x_{i,s}}{\partial p_i} - \frac{\partial x_{i,m}}{\partial m} x_i$ , show that the equation decomposes the demand change induced by price change ( $\partial p_i$ ) into substitution and income effects. (8marks)
- (b). Using an illustration, show that the “Law” of Downward-Sloping Demand curve always applies to normal goods. (7marks)

2. Game theory is useful in explaining a wide variety of phenomena, including the tendency for members of a cartel to cheat (that is, secretly cut price). Suppose that two firms- Atlas and Baker- form a cartel. Each firm has two possible strategies: to stick by the cartel agreement or cheat. There are four possible outcomes, depending on which strategy each firm pursues:

Possible strategies for Atlas	Possible strategies for Baker	
	Stick by agreement	Cheat
Stick by agreement	Atlas and Baker share the monopoly profit	Baker does better than under the agreement: Atlas does much worse
Cheat	Atlas does better than under the agreement; Baker does much worse	Both firms do somewhat worse than under the agreement

- a) If Baker sticks by the agreement, which strategy is better for atlas? (2marks)
- b) If Baker cheats, which strategy is better for Atlas? Explain your answer. (2marks)
- c) If Atlas sticks by the agreement, which strategy is better for Baker? Explain your answer. (3marks)
- d) If Atlas cheats, which strategy is better for Baker? Explain your answer. (3marks)
- e) In the given situation “prisoner’s dilemma”, do both parties fare worse than if they cooperated? (3marks)
- f) What sort of advice can a cartel adopt to encourage less cheating? (2marks)